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TRIBUTE TO JUDGE THEODORE MCMILLIAN
HON. THOMAS F. EAGLETON*
I have known Judge Theodore MeMillian for over forty years. In
fact, the first case I tried was as a court-appointed defense attorney
against the experienced and respected St. Louis prosecutor, Ted
McMillian. In his time as an Assistant Circuit Attorney in St. Louis,
he was recognized as the ablest-I mean the ablest-trial attorney on
that staff. His talents and skills were manifest early in his legal career
and those talents and skills became more widely known as he
advanced through the Missouri judicial system and ultimately to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, where he has
served with great distinction since 1978.
I am proud to have recommended Judge McMillian to President
Carter for his appointment to the Eighth Circuit. In my introductory
remarks to the Senate Judiciary Committee on August 16, 1978, I
noted the following:
As a member of the appellate bench, Judge McMillian quickly
built a reputation as a prolific but careful opinion writer. More
importantly, he made his mark as an independent thinker
whose frequent dissents often were credited with changing the
opinions of his colleagues. Despite the great volume of work
which flowed from his pen, Judge McMillian never allowed
the quality of justice to take a back seat to quantity.
* Partner, Thompson Coburn, St. Louis, Missouri; United States Senator for the State of
Missouri, 1968-87.
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I cited a case to the committee that I felt revealed Judge
McMillian's judicial philosophy, a case in which McMillian sharply
criticized trial judges for being "more interested in case movement
than ... in the quality of the trial."' McMillian said that he hoped
"the time will never come when we, as jurists, because of the
pressure from overloaded trial calendars and dockets will sacrifice,
for speed, the quality of justice that we attempt to dispense."2 In
writing that opinion, McMillian could have been writing his own
motto as a judge.
There were no objections of any kind to Judge McMillian's
nomination. He sailed through the Senate confirmation hearing in
under fifteen minutes.
Judge McMillian has distinguished himself in many areas of the
law during his service as both a state and federal judge. In this tribute
I would like to focus on Judge McMillian's devotion to the
preservation of individual civil rights. Throughout his four decades
on the bench, Judge McMillian has addressed many important civil
rights issues, including First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment claims and race, sex, and religion employment
discrimination issues. As Congress has passed new civil rights laws,
creating new issues for the federal courts, Judge McMillian has
consistently responded with concern for the rights of individual
citizens. His continuing commitment to preserving individual
liberties is evident in his recent decisions.
For example, in 1989 Judge McMillian authored the Eighth
Circuit's opinion in Mergens v. Board of Education,3 a case applying
the 1984 Equal Access Act (EAA)4 to protect the religious rights of
public high school students. The EAA provides that if a public high
school receiving federal funds allows non-curriculum-related student
groups to meet on school premises, the school must not deny access
1. State v. Holland, 534 S.W.2d 258, 266 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (McMillian, J.,
dissenting).
2. Id.
3. Mergens v. Board ofEduc., 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989), affd, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).





to or discriminate against any student group based on the content of
the speech at group meetings.' In Mergens, the Court of Appeals held
that a Nebraska public school district had violated this statute by
discriminating against high school students who wanted to form a
Bible study club.' School officials permitted the students to meet
informally on school grounds after regular class hours, but would not
allow the group, because of its religious focus, to become a part of
the school's official student activity program." As a result, the Bible
study group did not receive certain privileges given to official student
clubs.'
In his opinion for the Eighth Circuit panel, Judge McMillian
rejected the school board's attempt to dilute the application of the
EAA. The judge stressed that Congress's intent was to prevent
discrimination against unfavored speech, and that if a public high
school allows even one non-curriculum-related student group to use
school facilities, the school must provide equal access to other
student groups.9
The school board argued that all the high school clubs were
curriculum-related, even the scuba diving club, which the board
claimed promoted physical education.'" Judge McMillian responded
with common sense and respect for Congress' intent: "Allowing such
a broad interpretation of 'curriculum-related' would make the EAA
meaningless [because] the administration could arbitrarily deny
access to school facilities to any unfavored student club on the basis
of its speech content. This is exactly the result that Congress sought
to prohibit by enacting the EAA."" The court concluded the EAA
prohibited the school district from denying equal treatment to the
Bible study group. 2
5. See 20 U.S.C. § 407 1(a).
6. See Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1077, 1079.
7. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247.
8. See id.
9. See Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1078.
10. See id.
11 Id.
12. Seeid. at 1079.
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The court of appeals also upheld the constitutionality of the EAA
against the school board's Establishment Clause challenge. Judge
McMillian noted that the Supreme Court had previously decided that
a state university does not violate the Establishment Clause by
allowing all student groups, including religious groups, equal access
to university facilities. 3 Among other reasons for its decision, the
Supreme Court had found university students were mature enough to
understand that an equal access policy is neutral toward religion. 4
Judge McMillian noted that Congress had considered the maturity
level of high school students when Congress enacted the EAA, and
the court of appeals accepted Congress's fact-finding. 5 The court of
appeals concluded that the EAA was constitutional and the board was
required to comply with it. 6
More recently, Judge McMillian further demonstrated his
commitment to civil rights in In re Young, 7 an unusual bankruptcy
case requiring the court of appeals to interpret the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (the RFRA). 8 The Youngs, a married
couple, had filed for bankruptcy. They were active members of a
church and regularly tithed, or contributed one-tenth of their income
to the church, based on their religious convictions. 9 The trustee of
the bankruptcy estate contended the church was required to turn over
to the trustee the tithes paid during the year immediately before the
Youngs filed for bankruptcy, because those contributions were
avoidable "fraudulent transfers" under the Bankruptcy Code.20
The court of appeals, on the other hand, concluded that forcing the
church to turn over the tithes would interfere with the Youngs'
13. See id.
14. See id. at 1079-80 (discussing Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,271-77 (1981)).
15. See id. at 1080.
16. See id.
17. In re Young, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, Christians v.
Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997) (remanding for further consideration
in light of City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997)).
18. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994)).
19. Seelnre Young, 82F.3dat 1410.




religious rights under the RFRA. Assuming the RFRA was
constitutional (an issue not raised or decided in the case), the court of
appeals applied the statute to protect the Youngs' practice of tithing.2
Judge McMillian wrote the majority decision, and his sensitivity to
religious freedom is evident throughout the opinion.
The RFRA prohibits governmental action that substantially
burdens a person's religious practice unless the action is the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.22
In interpreting the scope of the statute, Judge McMillian recognized
that a person's religious practice can be significant even if it is not
absolutely required by that person's religion. In this case, the
Youngs' church did not require that they tithe in order to be members
or participate in church activities, but the Youngs' tithing was a
sincere expression of their religious beliefs. Judge McMillian
concluded their tithing was a practice protected by RFRA because the
tithing was religiously motivated.23
Judge McMillian also believed the debtors' practice of tithing
would be substantially burdened if the church had to turn over the
tithes to the bankruptcy trustee. Judge McMillian rejected the notion
that the church could be forced to turn over the tithes because the
debtors could continue to tithe in the future and could express their
religious beliefs in other ways. He stated that allowing the
government to recover the tithes for the year before the Youngs filed
for bankruptcy would effectively prevent the Youngs from tithing for
that year.24 In the judge's view, that would be a substantial burden.
He believed it was enough that the government action would
meaningfully curtail a significant religious practice, even though the
effect on that practice would be retroactive.'
Again demonstrating the high value he places on free religious
expression, Judge McMillian explained that only the most weighty
government interests will qualify as "compelling" interests and
21. Seeid. at 1417.
22. See42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1b).
23. See In re Young, 82 F.3d at 1418.
24. See id
25. See id. at 1418-19.
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permit the government to place substantial burdens on religious
practices.26 The judge started from the premise that even important
government interests may not be serious enough to be "compelling"
when balanced against the free exercise of religion. He stated that the
goals of the banruptcy system-allowing debtors a fresh start and
protecting the interests of creditors-were simply not serious enough
to allow the government to interfere with the Youngs' tithing.27 Based
on this reasoning, the bankruptcy trustee was not permitted to recover
the tithes from the Youngs' church.2" Although the constitutionality
of RFRA was later successfully challenged on separation of powers
grounds,29 Judge McMillian's construction of the law while it was in
effect was consistent with his longstanding philosophy of respect for
individual rights.
As these recent cases demonstrate, Judge McMillian continues to
decide current legal issues with the same concern for civil rights that
he has displayed throughout his career. Although no one can predict
how the legal landscape may change in the future, I am certain Judge
McMillian will continue to carry out his judicial responsibilities with
a dedication to the law and the personal freedoms it guarantees.
26. See id. at 1419.
27. See id. at 1420.
28. See id.
29. See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
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